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Computational Results Replication
In order to assess the robustness of our results and the capacity to generalize to different virtual economies, we applied the same computational analyses on another dataset obtained using a different implementation of the Kiyotaki and Wright model, closer to the one originally used by Duffy and Ochs (2001) . It differs from the present protocol on two main aspects: first the behavioral task compounds multiple economy initializations (i.e. all agents start again with their production good in stock) and the experimental economy is constituted of a total of 24 agents (real and virtual). The environment subjects faced was then much less stable and the goods' proportions were much more volatile. Crucially, despite these changes, we replicated the main effects of the computational analysis presented in the paper. Model Comparison. The exceedance probability and posterior probabilities based on the loglikelihood used as an approximation of the model evidence indicated that the OC-RL model better accounted for speculative behavior compared to the TD-RL model (XP = 1) (Fig. S3 C) . Model Simulation. At the aggregate level, we found no significant difference between the average speculation frequencies observed in the subjects and those predicted by the OC-RL model (data: 0.38 ± 0.05, OC-RL: 0.37 ± 0.05, Z = 0.17, P = 0.86, signed-rank test), but we found this difference to be significant for the TD-RL model (TD-RL: 0.32 ± 0.04, Z = 5.18, P < 0.001, signed-rank test). At the group level, we found similarly that the average speculation frequencies observed and predicted by the OC-RL model were not significantly different for both speculators (data: 0.78 ± 0.02, OC-RL: 0.78 ± 0.03, Z = -0.11, P = 0.91, signed-rank test) and non-speculators (data: 0.12 ± 0.02 OC-RL: 0.12 ± 0.03, Z = 0.71, P = 0.48, signed-rank test), whereas there were significant differences for the TD-RL model (TD-RL: speculators: 0.66 ± 0.02, Z = 3.92, P < 0.001; non-speculators: 0.11 ± 0.02, Z = 2.69, P = 0.007, signed-rank tests). This latter result is reflected in the dynamics of the average speculation in both groups (Fig. S3 D & E) , particularly in the speculators group, for which the TD-RL predictions systematically underestimate the actual average speculation evolution across trials (Fig. S3 D) , contrary to the predictions of the OC-RL model (Fig. S3 E) . Computational phenotypes of speculation. We also replicated the result on the opportunity cost learning rate (i.e., the feature of this model that allows accounting for missing speculative opportunities) that was significantly different for speculators and non-speculators (non-speculators: 0.12 ± 0.05, speculators: 0.19 ± 0.07, Z = -2.19, P = 0.0284, two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test) (Fig. S3 F) .
Accounting for intertemporal and counterfactual learning in a unique hybrid model
In order to explore the possible coexistence of both learning processes, we derived a hybrid model nesting TD-RL and OC-RL. The two models being very similar, their common parameters ( that adjust the stochasticity of the decision process and the learning rate adjusting the amplitude of the value change from one trial to the next) can be directly used in the hybrid model without doubling them (Table S2 ). In contrast, the discount rate of the TD-RL model and the counterfactual learning rate of the OC-RL model must be both added separately and cannot be confounded. Finally, considering the difference in the task structure account of the OC-RL and TD-RL models, the hybrid model compounds, in addition to all free parameters of the two original models, an additional one balancing both models' predictions in "choice conditions" (for a total of 5 free parameters, Table S2 ). As a recall, choice conditions are situations where the agent has to choose which good to hold for the next trial(s).
In the original TD-RL model, the agent simply uses the same learning rule as in every other condition, learning the value of both options (accepting and refusing the exchange) taking into account future anticipated and discounted rewards in the update process. After every trial , the value of the chosen option ' ("accepting the exchange" or "refusing the exchange", henceforth, and , respectively) in the state ' is updated according to the following rule:
'01 ( ' , ' ) = ' ( ' , ' ) + ' where ' is the prediction error and calculated as
where ' is the reward obtained as an outcome of choosing ' in the state ' and max < =>? ∈ ' ( '01 , '01 ) the maximum of the action values of the + 1 state. In other words, the prediction error ' is the difference between the expected reward ' ( ' , ' ) and the actual reward
In contrast, in the OC-RL model, agents learn which good to hold in conditions where they do not have such a choice to make and where they experience the costs and benefits of holding them. In these conditions, two cases must be defined. The first is the case of a realized exchange (i.e., when both matched agents mutually agree on it), in which the held good value is updated with a similar rule used in the TD-RL model but without taking into account future rewards:
where ′ ' is the prediction error and calculated as ′ ' = ' − ' ( F ) where ' ( F ) is the value of the good hold at the beginning of the round. The second case concerns unrealized exchanges in which the value of the good held at the beginning of the trial is updated in a similar manner but with a second learning rate and a prediction error including opportunity costs. The updating rule is then Then in these conditions, for = 1, the nested model is equivalent to the TD-RL model and for = 0, it is equivalent to the OC-RL model. In the "experience conditions", where agents have the opportunity to exchange the good that they are storing for their consumption good or a same-type good, the only difference between the two original models is the account of discounted future outcomes in the update of current options' value whose amplitude is determined by the discount rate :
Thus, in these conditions, for = 0, the nested model is equivalent to the OC-RL model and for > 0, it is equivalent to the TD-RL model. To summarize, the hybrid model is equivalent to the TD-RL model for = 1 and > 0 whereas it is equivalent to the OC-RL model for = 0 and = 0. We fitted subjects' behaviors with this new hybrid model and the optimized parameters tended to indicate a mixture of both temporal and opportunity costs learning processes with an average value of = 0.49 ± 0.06 and an average value of = 0.54 ± 0.05. However, due to its additional complexity, the model failed in the model comparison and the winning model remains the OC-RL model ( = 0.999) (Fig. S4) . All metrics were calculated from the BIC, taking then into account the difference in model complexity between the hybrid model and the two original ones.
Methods
Computational Analysis. We also computed the predictions of the original Kiyotaki and Wright model of money emergence on which the behavioral task is based (i.e., derived from the equilibrium individual prescriptions on optimal strategies). KW model. The original Kiyotaki and Wright model is a theoretical model of money emergence characterizing conditions under which a particular commodity becomes a money. More precisely, authors describe steady state equilibria that arise according to the parametrization of the model. Similarly as in previous implementation of the model 1,2 , we chose a set of parameters compatible with the speculative equilibrium. Then a subpart of the original model can be translated into decision rules for each agent in each possible situation in this economy, giving deterministic prescriptions that we used to create a decision model for individual agents of type 1 (the only agent's type we analysed). The latter prescriptions can be classified according to four main rules:
o Refusing the exchange when the proposed good and the stored good are of the same type. o Refusing the exchange when the partner's and the agent are of the same type. o Accepting the exchange when the proposed good is the agent's consumption good. o When proposed an exchange for the speculative good:
• Accepting the exchange if
Where c3 and c2 are the storage costs of goods 3 and 2 respectively, p31 and p21 the proportions of types 3 and 2 agents respectively holding good 1, u the utility of consumption and β a discount parameter.
• Refusing it otherwise.
Fig. S1. Theoretical Equilibrium in the Experimental Economy.
The plot shows the evolution of the three steady-state equilibrium proportions of production good held by the three types of agents. Colored lines represent the proportion for each subject's virtual economy individually while the black thick line represents the average proportion. Table S1 . The table summarizes the parameterization of the virtual economy: "nAgents" the number of agents in the economy, including n-1 virtual agents and 1 real subject; "Storing Costs" the storing costs value for type 1, 2 and 3 goods (in our setting, cyan, yellow, magenta) common across all agents' types; "Consumption Utility" the utility value of consumption common across all agents' types; "Beta" the discount parameter used to determine virtual agents strategies; "nTrial" the total number of trials in the experiments; "nBlock" the number of subdivision of the total number of trials. 
